will stop partly out of habit, partly out of prudence, partly out of direct concern for others, and perhaps partly out of respect for the law; and the other party, if she stopped to think, would know all this. But even so, the law about traffic lights played an important causal role in bringing about the situation where habit, prudence, concern for others, and so on, conspire to make me stop. The law therefore played an important causal role in creating and justifying the other party's expectation that I will stop.)
At one level, my moral obligation to stop at the red light can be explained without any reference at all to the law. I should stop because of the injurious consequences of not stopping, given other people's expectations and behavior. Still, the law was crucial in creating the relevant expectations and, thus, in bringing it about that my moral obligations with regard to traffic lights are what they are. And it was the main purpose of the law, if not to create the moral obligations (since the mere existence of moral obligations can hardly be thought to be a good in itself), then to create the organization of communal expectations and behavior that the moral obligations fall out of.
The law about traffic lights solves a coordination problem. It is representative of a vast range of other cases in which laws solve, and are intended to solve, other coordination problems. The example is simple; the function it points to is as important as any function law serves. 4 Now, the observation that many laws solve coordination problems may seem too obvious to bother with. In fact, I shall have no choice but to say some obvious things in the course of trying to get straight just what it is of moral significance that law does for us. But for what it is worth, my observation may be a bit less obvious than it seems, inasmuch as I would reject most of the thinking that conventionally surrounds the idea that laws somehow solve coordination problems.
The idea that laws solve coordination problems most often crops up in connection with the "fair-play" argument for a general moral obligation to obey the law. But I differ with fair-play theorists on at least three grounds. In the first place, I do not think there is any basic moral obligation of "fair-play," that is, of holding up one's end in fair cooperative arrangements. Insofar as there are particular obligations which suggest this general fair-play obligation, they are generated by utilitarian considerations. (This obviously is a topic too large to argue about here.) In the second place, fair play theorists tend to believe that achieving coordination often requires non-act-utilitarian behavior. They suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that we ought to hold up our end in some cooperative scheme instead of doing the act-utilitarian thing, because general act-utilitarian behavior would destroy coordination entirely. This is simply a mistake. The red-light example is by no means the best example for showing that this is a mistake, but notice that even in that example my stopping at a red light while someone else drives through the intersection is not only the behavior that coordination requires, it is also thoroughly act-utilitarian. 5 Finally, even if there were an obligation of fair play which sometimes required non-act-utilitarian behavior, that would not entail a general moral obligation to obey the law, for the simple reason that the law might sometimes enact unfair cooperative schemes. Once we decide that some particular act required by some law is not required by fairness, then the fact that the law requires it provides no reason at all for doing it (not just a reason that is overridden, but no reason at all). Nor can we avoid this point by saying the legal system is a single overarching cooperative scheme which we should abide by so long as it is reasonably fair. There is no ground for thinking we have any basic obligation to follow all the details of a scheme, when those details are unrelated to fairness or perhaps even positively unfair, just because the scheme is reasonably fair as a whole.
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Of course, if there were a basic obligation of fair play, then the fair-play theorist could say the same thing about law that I say from the act-utilitarian perspective: he could say that many laws create particular moral obligations by setting up particular fair cooperative schemes which, once they are brought into existence, morally demand participation. But this would still be a case of laws creating moral obligations; it would not demonstrate the existence of a general moral obligation to obey the law.
In the last two paragraphs, which dealt with the relation between a hypothetical obligation of fair play and a general moral obligation to obey the law, I have gotten a bit ahead of myself by assuming some ideas I shall develop more carefully when I explain from the act-utilitarian point of view why there is no moral obligation to obey the law even though many laws create moral obligations. To reemphasize the main point made so far: the red-light example discussed above is a case in which law is intended to and does create moral obligations in the course of solving a coordination problem, without reference to any general moral obligation to obey the law and without requiring any non-act-utilitarian behavior.
Let us tum now to a different red-light example. Imagine that you are driving in a flat desert. You approach an intersection, and you are facing a red light. Sometimes there is traffic at this intersection (that accounts for the presence of the traffic light), but on this occasion you can see that there is no other car within a mile in any direction. The law unequivocally requires that
